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Missouri's Law on Admissibility of Other
Crimes Evidence: Increasing Inclusivity?
State v. Skillicorn'
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence of other crimes, or uncharged misconduct evidence as it is
commonly called, has been important in many criminal trials, including such
well-publicized trials as that of O.J. Simpson for murder and those of William
Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson for rape.2 Furthermore, this type of evidence
is important because studies have shown that admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence greatly increases the likelihood that a jury will find the
defendant guilty.3
State v. Skillicorn4 presents a look at the current state of the law concerning
admission of other crimes evidence in Missouri. The case illustrates the
difficulty in applying current rules on the admission of such evidence and the
need for more definite guidelines on admission of other crimes evidence.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In August 1994, Dennis Skillicom, Allen Nicklasson, and Tim
DeGraffenreid left Kansas City, Missouri and headed east on a trip to pick up
illegal drugs.5 During their return trip on August 23rd, their car broke down
about twenty miles east of Kingdom City, Missouri on Interstate Highway 70.6
A state trooper stopped to help, but the three men refused any assistance.7 By
the next day, they made it about seventeen miles to the JJ overpass, a few miles
1. 944 S.W.2d 877 (Mo.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 568 (1997).
2. For a comprehensive discussion of uncharged misconduct evidence, see
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1998). Professor
Imwinkelried states that Judge Ito's ruling which limited the amount of uncharged
misconduct evidence the prosecution could use was a factor in O.J. Simpson's acquittal.
Id. § 1.01. The turning point which led to the acquittal.of William Kennedy Smith came
when the circuit judge "refused to allow the testimony of three women who claimed that
Smith had also raped or assaulted them in the past." Mark Hanson, Experts Expected
Smith Verdict, 78 A.B.A. J. 18 (1992). Mike Tyson's conviction was partially a result
of uncharged misconduct evidence which was admitted under Indiana's rules of
evidence. William Nack, On Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 20, 1992, at 46, 49.
3. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160-61, 178-79
(1966). Nickolas J. Kyser, Note, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 535, 544 (1974).
4. 944 S.W.2d 877 (Mo.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 568 (1997).
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from Kingdom City, where they burglarized a home and stole some guns and
money.8 They then used the money to pay for a tow to Kingdom City.9 The
garage in Kingdom City could not repair all of the car problems, but the three
men managed to drive back east toward the home they had recently robbed. 0
However, their car stalled again on the south outer road not far from Kingdom
City."
Soon after, Richard Drummond came upon the three men and offered to
drive them to a phone. 2 Skillicorn and Nicklasson both had stolen guns from
the previous burglary. 3 Nicklasson held a gun to Drummond's head while they
loaded the other stolen items into Drummond's trunk.14 As Drummond drove
the car east on Interstate-70, accompanied by the three men, Skillicorn and
Nicklasson discussed Drummond's fate quietly, not wanting him to panic.'5
They then instructed him to take an exit just east of Higginsville, Missouri and
drove four miles to a secluded area. 16 At this juncture, Skillicom demanded that
Drummond relinquish his wallet, and then watched as Nicklasson led
Drummond toward a wooded area and shot Drummond twice in the head. 7
Following the shooting, the three men drove Drunimond's car to a friend's
house in Blue Springs, Missouri.' s An argument ensued outside of the house in
which Skillicom and Nicklasson both held guns to the head of Ker McEntee, a
friend of DeGraffenreid's who was present at the time. The owner of the house
then came outside and Skillicorn and Nicklasson left.'9 The two men
subsequently committed several burglaries and a robbery before they were
caught by law enforcement officers.20
The Circuit Court of Lafayette County convicted Dennis Skillicorn of first
degree murder and sentenced him to death.2 The Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that evidence of the uncharged assault against McEntee,
committed by Skillicorn and Nicklasson following Drummond's murder, was
relevant and admissible.22 The court concluded the evidence was part of a









16. Id. at 883.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 886.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 888.
21. Id. at 877.
22. Id. at 886-87.
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EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
picture for the jury, showing that Skillicom aided or encouraged Nicklasson in
the murder of Drummond.'
IH. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Evidence of Other Crimes
The rule prohibiting the use of uncharged misconduct evidence to show the
defendant's propensity to commit a particular crime traces back over three
centuries to England.24 Courts initially followed the view that any evidence
relevant to the currently charged crime was admissible, even if only to prove the
defendant's character,25 which was in turn used to prove conduct.
26
Then, in 1865, Parliament passed an Act leading to the rule forbidding the
prosecution from attacking the defendant's character unless the defendant put her
character in issue.27 In the early twentieth century, this restriction led to many
alternative theories of logical relevance for admitting uncharged misconduct
evidence to prove a defendant's knowledge, intent, motive, and identity.28 At
this time in England, courts tended to view the uncharged misconduct evidence
doctrine as inclusive, meaning they would allow such evidence under most any
theory of logical relevance except to prove character.29 Eventually, all of these
theories became exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of uncharged
misconduct evidence.3" This led to some debate over whether English courts
were actually following an exclusionary approach, with evidence admissible
only if it fell into a recognized exception. 3' However, the inclusionary view,
which held that evidence of uncharged misconduct was admissible unless the
only theory of logical relevance was the use of the defendant's character as proof
of his conduct, was eventually vindicated as the sounder approach.32
23. Id.
24. IWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.25.
25. IWVINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.25.
26. IMVVINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.25.
27. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.25. Parliament passed the Treason Act of
1695, which provided that a defendant could only be tried for the act specified in the
pleading against him. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.25.
28. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.26.
29. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.26.
30. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.26; see also Jennifer Y. Schuster,
Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of Inextricably
Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 951 (1988).
31. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.26. For a discussion of the "inclusionary"
versus "exclusionary" views, see Edward G. Mascolo, Uncharged-Misconduct Evidence
and the Issue ofIntent: Limiting the Need for Admissibility, 67 CONN. B.J. 281, 287-89
(1993).
32. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.26.
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English rules regarding the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence
influenced American courts.33 In the early 1800s, American courts generally
restricted the use of evidence of other crimes.34 Toward the mid-1800s, however
many American courts began to expand the number of exceptions for admitting
such evidence. 5 Then came the landmark case of People v. MolineuX36 that
discussed when evidence of uncharged misconduct was admissible. In general,
the State could not offer evidence of other crimes to prove character, which was
in turn used to show the defendant was guilty of the crime with which he was
charged.37 However, the court provided a list of logical relevance theories
making uncharged misconduct evidence admissible for purposes other than to
show character. These theories included using the evidence to show intent,
motive, identity, absence of mistake, and common scheme or plan.38
The exceptions to admitting uncharged misconduct evidence further
evolved after Molineux. Significantly, courts began to recognize what became
known as res gestae evidence.39 This evidence consisted of facts which
surrounded the offense at issue. Courts generally admitted this evidence because
the facts were so connected with the charged offense as to be-inextricably
intertwined, because they were components of the charged offense, or sometimes
because they served to present a complete picture of the crime.40 Some courts
treated this type of evidence as evidence of other crimes which was admitted as
33. Schuster, supra note 30, at 953.
34. Schuster, supra note 30, at 953.
35. Schuster, supra note 30, at 953.
36. 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1902).
37. Id. at 292-93.
38. Id. at 293.
39. Schuster, supra note 30, at 955-56.
40. Schuster, supra note 30, at 956. See also State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 810
(Mo. 1994) (admitting evidence of "uncharged crimes that are part of the circumstances
or the sequence of events surrounding the offense charged"); State v. Jordan, 937 S.W.2d
262,268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that evidence of separate offense is admissible if
it tends to establish the res gestae of the charged offense). Courts have taken a variety
of views on the admissibility of evidence under the res gestae theory. See
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 6.28 (discussing the view permitting admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence if the crime is committed simultaneously);
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 6.29 (discussing the view that the uncharged misconduct
evidence just needs to be in the same series of events in order to be admissible);
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 6.30 (discussing the view that requires the evidence to
be independently logically relevant in order to be admissible). See also, e.g., United
States v. Bettelyoun, 892 F.2d 744, 746-47 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating evidence of assault
several hours before charged shooting was an "integral part of the operative facts of the
crime charged"); Pickens v. Lockhart, 802 F. Supp. 208, 217 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aff'd, 4
F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1993) ("almost simultaneous").
[Vol. 64
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an exception to the general prohibition,4' while others got around the general rule
altogether by characterizing it as evidence which was part of the crime charged.42
Inconsistent treatment by courts of the general rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence of other crimes and of the res gestae exception eventually
led to the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), based in large part on the
Molineux decision. 3 Rule 404(b) has characteristics of both the inclusionary and
exclusionary approaches that courts used in the past.44 The first sentence of Rule
404(b) states the general rule that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to
prove "the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. 45 Such evidence, however, may be used for other purposes, "such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident .... ,46
While this list of exceptions indicates that evidence of other crimes should
not be admitted unless it falls under one of the listed categories, the "such as"
language preceding the, list of exceptions has led to the belief that the list is not
41. Schuster, supra note 30, at 956 (citations omitted).
42. Schuster, supra note 30, at 957 (citations omitted).
43. Schuster, supra note 30, at 958. The federal rules of evidence were adopted
in 1975. Rule 404(b) states in full:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
FED. R EvID. 404(b).
44. See Schuster, supra note 30, at 95; see also IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, §
2.31 (stating that "[o]n its face, [404(b)] is 'vintage' inclusionary approach") (citing
Michael S. Quinn, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Similar Acts Evidence in the Eighth
Circuit, 48 UMKC L. REv. 342, 389 (1980)); Jason M. Brauser, Comment, Intrinsic or
Extrinsic?: The Confusing Distinction Between Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and
Other Crimes Evidence Under Rule 404(b), 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1582, 1597 (1994)
(stating that 404(b) follows the inclusionary approach); Lisa M. Segal, Note, The
Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offense Cases: New Federal
Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 515,
521 (1995) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence essentially codify the "common-
law exclusionary rule" but with a "slightly broader view of the traditional rule of
exclusion") (citations omitted). Many scholars, including Professor Imwinkelried, also
point out that the use of the words "such as" in both Rule 404(b) itself and in the
Advisory Committee's Note is evidence of the drafters intent that the rule follow an
inclusionary approach. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.31.
45. FED R. EVID. 404(b).
46. FED R. EVID. 404(b).
1999]
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exhaustive.4 7 Therefore, it is generally thought that the Federal Rules of
Evidence follow an inclusionary approach, whereby such evidence can be
admitted for any logically relevant purpose other than to show character.48 Rule
404(b) was designed to bring about uniformity in the way federal courts treat the
use of uncharged misconduct evidence. This goal has largely been successful,
as every federal circuit court has now held that Rule 404(b) follows the
inclusionary approach.49
B. Development of the Evidence of Other Crimes Doctrine in Missouri
Missouri's law of evidence, unlike the federal rules of evidence, has not
been codified into a formal set of rules to which the courts can look. Instead, it
has developed through case law and statutes." The Missouri rules of evidence
are summarized, however, in Missouri Evidence Restated.5 Missouri's
equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is summarized as follows:
Otherwise, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be
admissible when offered on proper lesser included issues, such as
proof of motive, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan,
knowledge, identity, opportunity or "means of committing" the
charged crime, or absence of mistake or accident, and when offered
for other purposes, including proof of the res gestae of the crime
charged, and proof of later criminal conduct intended to intimidate a
crime witness. 52
Notable differences from the federal rules are the addition of the "common
scheme" language instead of just using the "plan" exception, the language
pertaining to the res gestae of a crime, and evidence of intimidation of witnesses.
Like the federal rules, the development of Missouri's common law
regarding the admission of evidence of other crimes stemmed from People v.
47. Brauser, supra note 44, at 1597.
48. Brauser, supra note 44, at 1597. See also IMwiNKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.31.
49. Professor Imwinkelried states that as of the mid-1980s, the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia
circuits all follow an inclusionary approach to admitting evidence of other crimes.
IMWNKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.31. In the Third circuit, however, the law on this
subject was unclear. By the mid-1990s, every circuit had held that 404(b) utilizes the
inclusionary rule. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.31. But see IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 2, § 2.30 (noting that while the inclusionary approach is now the majority view,
some states still follow the exclusionary view).
50. Mo. EVID. RESTATED at v (Mo. Bar 3d ed. 1996).
51. Mo. EVID. RESTATED at v (Mo. Bar 3d ed. 1996).
52. MO. EVID. RESTATED § 404(b)(3) (Mo. Bar 3d ed. 1996).
[Vol. 64
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/12
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
Molineux.53 Thus, the Missouri practice generally mirrors the federal rules,
including the traditional exceptions outlined in Federal Rule 404(b). However,
one significant difference between the two approaches is that while the federal
rules are generally interpreted under an inclusive view, Missouri traditionally has
not followed such an approach. 4 Missouri courts have instead tended to admit
evidence of other crimes only if it is relevant to prove an established exception
to the general rule against admitting such evidence. To determine these
exceptions, one must examine the cases that have been instrumental in the
development of Missouri's law in this area.
Molineux served as the basis for the current Missouri practice concerning
admission of evidence of other crimes.55 Molineux established that evidence of
other crimes was admissible to prove the crime charged in five specific
situations: to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common
scheme or plan, or the identity of the defendant. 6 Following Molineux, the
Missouri Supreme Court, in State v. Spray,7 announced the general rule that
evidence of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible unless it has some
legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant's guilt for the charged
offense.5"
Following Spray, the court adopted several specific exceptions allowing for
other crimes evidence. In 1905, in State v. Bailey,9 the court adopted a common
plan exception.60 In State v. Buxton,61 the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed
the general rule stated in Spray and attempted to clarify the common plan
exception, holding that a defendant did not fall under the common plan
exception simply because had committed one or more similar crimes.62
In 1947, in State v. Shilkett 3 the court admitted evidence of other crimes
to establish the absence of mistake or accident on the part of the defendant."
53. See Bradley D. Kuhlman, Comment, Prior Misconduct Evidence in Missouri,
58 Mo. L. REv. 907, 908 (1993).
54. IMW VINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 2.28. At the height of the exclusionary
approach around the time of Molineux, states that were traditionally considered as
following the inclusionary view included California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 2, § 2.28.
55. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
56. People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1902).
57. 74 S.W. 846 (Mo. 1903).
58. Id. at 848-49.
59. 88 S.W. 733 (Mo. 1905).
60. Id. at 740-41.
61. State v. Buxton, 22 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Mo. 1929).
62. Id. at 636-37.
63. State v. Shilkett, 204 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1947).
64. Id. at 923.
1999]
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Additionally, the court held that unless proof of a distinct crime had a legitimate
tendency to directly establish the defendant's guilt for the charged offense, or
showed an absence of mistake or accident, proof of such crime violated the
defendant's right to be tried only for the offense for which he was on trial.65
In 1954, in State v. Reese,66 the court again reaffirmed the general rule that
other crimes evidence could only be admitted if it had some legitimate tendency
to prove the crime charged.67 Furthermore, the court cited Molineux, stating that
its exceptions were well established,68 and that the test for admission as an
exception was as follows:
The acid test is its logical relevancy to the particular excepted purpose
or purposes for which it is sought to be introduced. If it is logically
pertinent in that it reasonably tends to prove a material fact in issue, it
is not to be rejected merely because it incidentally proves the
defendant guilty of another crime. But the dangerous tendency and
misleading probative force of this class of evidence requires that its
admission should be subjected by the courts to rigid scrutiny. 69
The court also stated that whether logical relevancy existed was a question for
the court to be resolved in light of the tendency that such evidence could
prejudice the minds of thejurors.70 If there was not a clear connection between
the evidence at issue and the charged offense, the defendant should be given the
benefit of the doubt and the evidence should be rejected.
After many years of recognizing only the five Molineux exceptions, in
1985, the Missouri Supreme Court took a step toward adopting a new exception
to the admission of other crimes evidence. In State v. Kenley,72 the defendant
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.73 The court admitted evidence
of a shooting just prior to the robbery and murder for which the defendant was
65. Id. at 923.
66. 274 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1954).
67. Id. at 307.
68. Id. For Missouri cases which have utilized various exceptions to admit or
exclude evidence of other crimes, see State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 518 (Mo. 1995),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 153 (1996) (motive); State v. Neil, 869 S.W.2d 734, 736-37 (Mo.
1994) (common scheme or plan); State v. Shaw, 847 S.W.2d 768, 777-78 (Mo.), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 895 (1993) (intent); State v. Mitchell, 491 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Mo. 1973)
(identity); State v. Crawford, 914 S.W.2d 390, 392-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (knowledge);
State v. Kerr, 531 S.W.2d 536, 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (preparation).
69. Reese, 274 S.W.2d at 307.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 693 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. 1985).-
73. Id. at 80.
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on trial.74 The court stated that "[c]onduct before and after the commission of
the charged crime is relevant where it relates to the elements of the charged
crime."75 The court found the evidence was relevant to the defendant's state of
mind during the course of the charged murder,76 and admitted it under the theory
that it also showed a common scheme or plan."
Then in 1990, in State v. Wacaser,78 the court admitted evidence of another
alleged killing committed by the defendant even though charges relating to it had
been dropped.79 The defendant, however, was on trial for a murder that occurred
contemporaneously with the other killing. 0 The court cited Kenley for the
proposition that "[t]he state is entitled to introduce evidence of the circumstances
surrounding the offense charged, and the relevant circumstances may include
other crimes. ' 81 While neither Kenley nor Wacaser expressly so stated, it
appears they may have utilized the res gestae concept to some extent, by
admitting evidence so inextricably intertwined as to be part of the charged
offense, a component of the charged offense, or necessary to "complete the
picture.
' 82
Although Kenley and Wacaser were somewhat unclear as to whether the
court was establishing a new exception to the general rule on admissibility of
other crimes evidence, in 1993 the Missouri Supreme Court clearly adopted a
new exception in State v. Bernard.8 3 The stage for this case was set one year
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id.
76. Id. For a discussion of the use of other crimes evidence to prove the
defendant's mental state, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an
Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines that Threaten to
Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 MIL. L. REv. 41 (1990).
77. State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Mo. 1985).
78. 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990).
79. Id. at 194
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Kenley, 693 S.W.2d at 79).
82. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text; see also State v. Flenoid, 838
S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (stating evidence that defendant charged with
cocaine possession carried a beeper and cash at the same time as arrest for possession of
drugs constituted "part of the res gestae of the charge being tried"); State v. Davis, 806
S.W.2d 441, 442-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating evidence that police officers saw
defendant charged with possession of controlled substance exchange items with other
persons prior to his arrest "established the res gestae of the crime with which defendant
was charged"); cf IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, §§ 6.28-6.30 (discussing cases which
admit evidence of other crimes committed simultaneously with the charged act, those
which admit such evidence if it is committed in the same series of events as the charged
act, and those which require an independent theory of relevance other than mere temporal
connection to admit such evidence, with an exception for crimes which are inseparably
connected).
83. 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1993).
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earlier in State v. Sladek.84 In Sladek, the defendant, a dentist, was charged with
sexual assault for the rape of one of his patients who was also employed as an
assistant in the same office.85 The defendant raped the victim after sedating her
to examine a chipped tooth.86 The evidence at issue was testimony by three
former patients that the defendant had touched their breasts (and one who
testified that Sladek called her at home four times on a Sunday, asking her to call
him at home).8 7 The court held it inadmissible because the evidence did not tend
to prove the defendant was guilty of sedating and raping the victim in the instant
case.
88
However, Justice Elwood Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he
discussed the application of the rule regarding the admissibility of other crimes
evidence 9 and the difficulty of applying the rule and its exceptions, particularly
the common plan or scheme exception.9" In the course of his opinion, he
specifically referred to an exception called "signature modus
operandi/corroboration," which he said was related to the identity exception.9
He discussed a case that involved evidence of past similar misconduct by the
defendant but where identity of the defendant was not an issue; the evidence
only served to corroborate the victim's complaint.92 Justice Thomas posited that
the same probative value and prejudice were involved in a corroboration case as
in an identity case, and thus, evidence that fell into the signature modus
operandi/corroboration category was also a proper exception."
Although the majority in Sladek did not adopt the views of Justice Thomas
at that time, his position was adopted one year later in State v. Bernard.
9 4
Bernard involved a defendant who was charged with first degree sexual abuse
and attempted forcible sodomy.95 The evidence at issue was the testimony of
84. 835 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1992).
85. Id. at 309.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 309-10.
88. Id. at 309-10, 312-13.
89. Id. at 313 (Thomas, J., concurring). In footnote one, Justice Thomas notes that
the opinion uses the term "prior crimes" to refer to the type of evidence being considered
under this issue, but that the same issues could arise with evidence of crimes subsequent
to the one charged. Id. at 314.
90. Id. at 313-18.
91. Id. at 316.
92. Id. at 316-317 (citing State v. Dee, 752 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
93. Id. at 317. Justice Thomas also noted this exception involved reasoning based
upon the defendant's propensity to commit the type of crime at issue. Id. Therefore, as
this is inconsistent with the general rule, it is "particularly important that the requirement
for a signature modus operandi be strictly enforced." Id.
94. 849 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1993).
95. Id. at 12.
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four witnesses, all about the same age as the victim, concerning prior sexual
abuse committed by the defendant for which he had never been charged. 96
The court began by stating the general rule from State v. Reese97 that
although evidence of other crimes is not admissible to show the propensity of the
defendant to commit a crime, it is admissible if it has some legitimate tendency
to establish the defendant's guilt for the charged offense.98 The court then noted
that such legitimate tendency tends to exist when the evidence of other crimes
establishes "(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or acciderit; (4) a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other; [or] (5) the
identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial." 99
However, the court stated that even if evidence did not fall within one of the five
listed exceptions, it could still be legally and logically relevant, and therefore
admissible."° The court then formally adopted the signature modus
operandi/corroboration exception raised by Justice Thomas in Sladek ° '
As a result of the holding in Bernard, the Missouri Supreme Court formally
recognized six exceptions to the general prohibition against the use of evidence
of other crimes. Given Missouri's history of following an exclusionary approach
to the doctrine of other crimes evidence, this raised the question of whether the
court would thereafter follow only the six enumerated exceptions, or would
instead embrace a more inclusionary approach by admitting any evidence of
other crimes that could be shown as legally and logically relevant and which did
not go to show the defendant's character.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State v. Skillicorn, °2 defendant Dennis Skillicom was convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death.' °3 On his appeal to the Missouri Supreme
Court, Skillicom asserted, among twenty-one other points, that the trial court
"erred in admitting evidence of subsequent offenses [by the defendant] because
such evidence was not relevant to any material issue and its prejudicial impact
96. Id.
97. 274 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. 1954).
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. (citing State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. 1992) (quoting People
v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1902))).
100. Id. The court noted that in cases of sexual abuse against children, Missouri
has been more liberal in admitting evidence of the defendant's past sexual misconduct.
Id.
101. Id. at 17. The court stated "[i]n the context of corroboration, evidence of prior
crimes is logically relevant in that it has a legitimate tendency to prove a material fact in
the case by corroborating the testimony of the victim as to the sexual assault." Id.
102. 944 S.W.2d 877 (Mo.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 568 (1997).
103. Id. at 882.
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outweighed its probative value. . . ,,"4 A divided court held that evidence of an
uncharged assault occurring several hours after the murder, in which the
defendant and his accomplices threatened another victim's life with the same
guns used in the murder, was admissible to show that the defendant aided in or
encouraged one of his accomplices in the murder of the victim and that he did
so after due deliberation.0 5 In so holding, the court admitted evidence of the
assault because it presented a complete and coherent picture of the sequence of
events surrounding the murder, thereby formally recognizing a seventh exception
to the general rule against the admission of other crimes evidence.'O6
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority first noted the principle that defendants "have the right to be
tried only for the offense for which they are charged."' 7 The court then cited
Bernard and Buxton for the proposition that evidence of other crimes is not
admissible to show the propensity of the defendant to commit a crime, but may
be admissible if it has a legitimate tendency to prove that the'defendant is guilty
of the crime with which he is charged.'08 The court further stated the evidence
must also be legally relevant "in that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial
effect.' '10
9
The majority highlighted the established exceptions for when evidence of
other crimes has been admissible in previous cases.10 The court noted the five
"recognized exceptions" of using the evidence to show intent, motive, absence
of mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan."' Additionally, the court
cited several cases where they also permitted evidence of other crimes in the past
to show the circumstances or sequence of events surrounding the charged
104. Id. at 883.
105. Id. at 887.
106. Id. at 886-87. While the court pointed to several cases as previously
establishing the use of such evidence for this purpose, the Missouri Supreme Court had
never explicitly recognized this exception and the previous cases are all factually
distinguishable (in that each involved evidence of other crimes that occurred either before
or contemporaneous with the charged offense, rather than after the charged offense).
Furthermore, while the court again was not very clear that it was adopting a new
exception, two months later in State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 591 (Mo. 1997), the
Missouri Supreme Court made it clear that is what it indeed did in this case. See infra
notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
107. State v. Skillicom, 944 S.W.2d 877, 886 (Mo.) (quoting State v. Hombuckle,
769 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Mo. 1986)), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 568 (1997).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 886 (citing State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. 1993)).
110. Id. at 88.6-87.
111. Id. at 886. (citing State v. Garrison, 116 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Mo. 1938)).
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offense. or to help present a complete and coherent picture."3 The court then
stated that the "recognized exceptions" were never meant to constitute an
"exclusive list" of exceptions.114 It pointed to the rule from Buxton that evidence
must merely have a legitimate tendency to prove the defendant guilty of the
charged offense and it must be "more probative than prejudicial."' 5
In the instant case, the majority stated the evidence regarding Skillicorn's
assault was a "continuation of the sequence of events that presents a coherent
picture of Skillicom's crime."'" 6 The court held such evidence was particularly
relevant because of its temporal closeness to the charged murder, because the
same guns were used in Drummond's murder and in the assault on McEntee, and
because the assault was committed to protect Drummond's car-the object for
which they had killed him."'
B. The Dissent
Judge Covington specifically disagreed with the majority's admission of
conduct by Skillicom after the murder." 8  She stated that "[t]he law on
admissibility of uncharged misconduct is well settled."" 9 She then discussed the
facts of State v. Reese, in which the Missouri Supreme Court stated the general
rule that proof of other crimes is not admissible unless it has a legitimate
tendency to directly prove the defendant's guilt of the offense for which he is
charged. 20 Furthermore, Judge Covington stated that the use of evidence of
other crimes could violate the defendant's right to be tried only for the charged
offense if it is not "properly related" to the issue on trial.' She expressed
concern that a jury could convict a defendant based on the "bad person"
argument rather than because he is guilty of the offense for which he is on
trial. 22
112. Id. (citing State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. 1990); State v.
Flenoid, 838 S.W.2d 462,467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Davis, 806 S.W.2d 441,443
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).
113. Id. at 886-87 (citing Flenoid, 838 S.W.2d at 467).
114. Id. at 887 (citing State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. 1993)).
115. Id. (citing State v. Buxton, 22 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Mo. 1929)).
116. Id. at 887.
117. Id. The court held that alternatively, the jury could infer "Skillicom's
murderous mental state" from the evidence of the events that surrounded the murder. Id.
118. Id. at 900 (Covington, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing State v. Reese, 274 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. 1954)).
121. Id. (citing Reese, 274 S.W.2d at 307).
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Judge Covington then addressed the exceptions to the general rule.' She
noted that Reese set forth the "well settled exceptions" and that Bernard had
stated that evidence of other crimes was admissible to prove the crime charged
when it was used to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident,
common scheme or plan, identity of the person charged with the offense, or a
signature modus operandi.' Whether the evidence was legally relevant enough
to fall within one of the exceptions is a question for the court to decide "in light
of the consideration that the inevitable tendency of such evidence is to raise a
'legally spurious presumption of guilt' in the minds ofjurors."'25 Additionally,
if the court did not clearly see the logical relevance between the evidence at issue
and the charged offense, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt
and the evidence should be held inadmissible. 26
In the instant case, Judge Covington believed the majority disregarded the
court's previous views in Reese, Bernard, and Sladek. 7 She stated the evidence
of the assault on McEntee did not fall into any of the established exceptions.
2 8
She further believed that if it was admissible under the idea that it was part of the
sequence of events surrounding the charged offense, this would only beg the
question as to what evidence would not fall into this category. 29 Therefore,
Judge Covington argued the evidence was not logically relevant, lacked any
probative value, and that its admission was reversible error."'
V. COMMENT
The effect of the majority's holding in Skillicorn is to formally create a
seventh exception to the general rule prohibiting the use of evidence of other
crimes to prove the defendant guilty of the crime for which he is currently on
trial. If there still was a question as to whether the court did indeed adopt the
exception that such evidence may be used to present a complete and coherent
picture of the sequence of events surrounding the charged offense, the court
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. 1993)).
125. Id. at 900-01 (quoting State v. Reese, 274 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Mo. 1954)).




130. Id. Judge Robertson wrote a separate concurrence in part and concurrence in
the result with which Judge Benton concurred. He agreed completely with Judge
Covington's analysis of admission of evidence of other crimes except that he did not
believe that the erroneous admission of the evidence pertaining to the assault on McEntee
required reversal. Id. at 899-900 (Robertson, J., concurring). Thus, while six of seven
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answered that question two months later in State v. Roberts131 when it stated,
"Skillicorn notes a seventh category permitting evidence of a continuation of a
sequence of events that assist in painting a coherent picture of the crime."'132 The
court in Roberts also noted that prior to Skillicorn, Bernard recognized five
categories of exceptions and added a sixth exception.1
33
Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court currently has recognized seven
exceptions to the rule against admission of evidence of other crimes, two of
which have been adopted since 1993. While Missouri traditionally has taken an
exclusionary approach to the doctrine of other crimes evidence, 34 adoption of
these new exceptions creates the appearance that the court may now be tending
toward a more inclusionary approach, admitting evidence of other crimes so long
as it is both logically and legally relevant and does not merely prove the
character of the defendant and his propensity to commit the charged crime.
Indeed, the Bernard court may have been essentially stating as much when it
said "[e]vidence of prior misconduct that does not fall within one of the five
enumerated exceptions may nevertheless be admissible if the evidence is legally
and logically relevant."' 35 While this was not the first time the Missouri
Supreme Court had mentioned this general rule, Bernard and Skillicorn served
as key cases in the court's evolving view on the admissibility of evidence of
other crimes, as they represented situations where the court utilized an
inclusionary view in order to admit evidence that did not fit within the
traditionally established exceptions.
This trend toward the inclusionary approach, while clearly in line with the
majority of jurisdictions (both state and federal), does raise some potential
concerns. First, adoption of such an approach gives courts tremendous
discretion over whether to admit evidence of other crimes. The inclusionary
approach provides no clear guidelines on when to admit such evidence and puts
the burden on the trial court to determine its logical and legal relevancy.
Following an exclusionary form of the rule instead, in the words of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, would "clearly serve[] to remind the bench and bar that,
131. 948 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1997). Roberts involved a defendant who was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death for beating to death a 56 year-old woman.
Id. at 585. In this case, there was evidence that the day after the murder, the defendant
drove around town in the victim's car and at some point the car was stolen from him. Id.
at 590-91. Prior to the trial, the defendant made a videotaped statement in which he said
that he wanted to kill the people who stole the car from him. Id. at 590. The defense
sought to have this evidence excluded, but the court admitted it under the theory that this
was a continuation of the sequence of events that presented a clear and coherent picture
of the crime, citing Skillicorn in support. Id. at 585, 591.
132. Id. at 591.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
135. State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. 1993) (citing State v. Sladek, 835
S.W.2d 308, 311-12 (Mo. 1992)).
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unlike most other evidence, this evidence carries with it heavy baggage that must
be closely scrutinized before admissibility is warranted."' 6 Granting courts the
discretion that exists under the inclusionary view will also make it more difficult
for defendants to have these evidentiary rulings overturned on appeal.
Second, the inclusionary approach gives the State an additional tool in
criminal prosecutions, as it will be harder for defendants to argue against the
admission of evidence of other crimes. Their only argument essentially will be
the prejudicial effect of the evidence admitted against them. Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court, in a case involving admissibility of other crimes
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), expressed that it shared the
"petitioner's concern that unduly prejudicial evidence might be introduced under
Rule 404(b)." '137 Given the prominence of this concern, the Maryland Court of
Appeals aptly stated the logic behind the exclusionary approach when it noted
that "it will be the exceptional, and not the usual, case where the evidence of
other bad acts is substantially relevant for reasons other than proof of criminal
character. If that assumption is correct, and we believe it is, the exclusionary
approach is certainly logical."' 38
In addition to the concerns raised by use of the inclusionary approach, the
adoption of the particular exception used in Skillicorn presents particular
problems of its own. As Judge Covington pointed out in her dissent, when
evidence of other crimes is admitted but is not properly related to the cause of
action on trial, it "violates the defendant's right to be tried for the offense for
which he has been indicted.' ' 39 There is a concern that the jury may otherwise
convict the defendant for being a "bad person" instead of properly convicting
him because he committed the crime for which he is on trial. 4 ° Judge Covington
further stated the principle that if the court could not see a clear, logical
connection between the evidence of the other crime and the crime with which the
defendant is charged, then the court should give the benefit of the doubt to the
defendant and not admit the evidence.' 41
In the instant case, the court admitted the evidence as part of the sequence
of events surrounding the murder allegedly committed by the defendant. It is at
least somewhat questionable whether evidence of actions by a defendant
subsequent to the commission of a murder which are not in some way
inseparable from the murder itself will always be probative of the fact that the
defendant committed the murder. Indeed, Judge Covington pointed out that if
the evidence at issue fit into the "sequence of events surrounding the [murder],"
136. Harris v. Maryland, 597 A.2d 956, 962 (Md. 1991).
137. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1991).
138. Harris v. Maryland, 597 A.2d 956, 961 (Md. 1991).
139. State v. Skillicorn, 944 S.W.2d 877, 900 (Mo.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 568
(1997).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 901.
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it would be difficult to determine what evidence would not fall into this
category.'42 Therefore, by admitting evidence of other crimes under this theory,
there is the potential problem that courts will face the difficulty of deciding at
what point during the circumstances surrounding the charged crime does
evidence of some other criminal act become no longer logically relevant. The
result of adopting this exception will be that a court will have broad discretion
in admitting evidence of surrounding circumstances that it views as logically
relevant to establishing the defendant's guilt. This discretion will make the
defense's job in criminal prosecutions much more difficult, as the only argument
with respect to this type of evidence will be that its prejudice to the defendant
outweighs its probative value.
In light of recent cases like Skillicorn and Bernard, Missouri's law on the
use of other crimes evidence has become more inclusive. In prior cases,
Missouri courts have primarily relied on the five traditional exceptions of intent,
motive, identity, absence of mistake, or common scheme or plan. In Bernard
and then in Skillicorn, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted two new exceptions
to the general rule prohibiting the use of other crimes evidence. This raises the
question whether Missouri is opting to follow the more inclusionary approach
to admitting other crimes evidence, that evidence is admissible if it is logically
relevant under any theory other than to prove the character of the defendant and
action in conformity therewith. While the Missouri Supreme Court has not
expressly stated that it has adopted the inclusionary view, Bernard and Skillicorn
create the impression that the court is indeed shiffing to such an approach. If this
is in fact the case, this change will lead to greater discretion of trial courts in
admitting evidence of other crimes and will limit criminal defendants' arguments
against admission of such evidence and thereby increase the likelihood of
conviction under the "bad person" theory.
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Skillicorn presents a look at the current state of the law regarding
admissibility of other crimes evidence. The Missouri Supreme Court expanded
to seven its list of recognized exceptions to the general rule, admitting evidence
of the sequence of events surrounding a crime which helps provide a clear and
coherent picture of the crime. With this expansion, the court has indicated that
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